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This paper explores the effect of letting individuals choose their retirement age in a world of 
uncertainty where there exist both deﬁned beneﬁt (DB) and deﬁned contribution (DC) pension 
plans. The paper shows that giving individuals the ﬂexibility to determine when to retire is an 
important tool for them when they are hedging against future uncertainty. It also ﬁnds that it is 
preferable to let people make their retirement decision after rather than before the uncertainty is 
lifted. Finally, it shows that shifting from DB to DC plans fosters the rate of activity of elderly 
workers. 
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There is quite a substantial literature that is concerned with the retirement
age of individuals. Part of this interest has to do with the large changes
in the retirement age that have occurred over the last twenty ﬁve years. It
turns out that this change has been much larger in males than in females.
The diﬀerence between the two may have a lot to do with the later entrance
of women into the labor force in large numbers. Many of these papers try to
determine the retirement age within the context of a life-cycle model where
the incentive eﬀects of both private and public pensions are very important
in determining when people will retire. For example, the percent of em-
ployees with deﬁned beneﬁt pensions with full beneﬁts prior to age 65 which
increased from 1980 to 1989 as well as the unanticipated increase in the level
of social security beneﬁts during the 1970s (Anderson et al., (1999)) may
have been contributing factors in inducing individuals to retire at a younger
age and thus help account for the reduction in labor force participation by
elderly males. On the other side, the more recent shift in pension plans
from deﬁned beneﬁt to deﬁned contribution plans (Poterba, Venti, and Wise
(2004)), the elimination of mandatory retirement in 1986, as well as the step
taken in 1983 to gradually increase the Social Security normal retirement age
to 67 may all have been contributing factors in halting the trend to earlier re-
tirement that occurred in the mid-1980s ( Maestas (2007b) and Gustman and
Steinmeier (2005)). More recent data suggest that the labor force participa-
tion rates by elderly males may even have started to increase. This increase is
in addition to the increase in labor force participation by elderly women that
has been occurring since the 1950s but has had its most dramatic rise since
the mid-1880s (Cahill et. al. (2005), Gustman and Steinmeier (2008), and
Maestas (2007b)). In addition to the above literature there is also a strand
that is focusing on the increase in bridge jobs in recent years. These are
short-duration or part-time jobs that individuals take after leaving a full-time
career. Thus these are jobs that bridge the gap between full time employ-
ment and when individuals completely withdraw from the labor force (Cahill
et. al. (2005). Finally, there is a literature that suggests that many people
reverse their decision about retirement and return to work. It is argued
that unretirement could be an intentional way of moving gradually out of
the labor force but also a response to negative shocks. (Maestas (2007a)).
The evidence presented so far pertains to the United States where most
of the empirical research is conducted. However, the issue of early retirement
induced by distortive pension systems concerns other OECD countries and
particularly the EU members at least as much or even more. See in this
respect the work of Gruber and Wise (1999, 2004) on retirement around
2the world. They explain most of early retirement on pension systems that
discourage working even well before the statutory age of retirement.
This paper takes a somewhat diﬀerent approach to the above literature
in looking at the issue of retirement. In a world of uncertainty individuals
attempt to hedge against future events by using strategies that will insure
that they have the wherewithal to consume in their old age. The standard
ways of preparing for the future are through private saving, private deﬁned
beneﬁt plans, private deﬁned contribution plans, and social security. In this
paper we add an additional element. Individuals are allowed to retire when
they want, even beyond the statutory retirement age. The age at which they
end up retiring will then depend on the circumstances they expect to face in
the future. In the paper two cases are considered. In one case the decision
about when to retire is made independent of which state occurs in the future
and in the second case individuals are able to make their retirement decision
contingent on which state occurs. Finally, to provide some context for the
results obtained, in a third section the paper looks at the case of mandatory
retirement and compares those results with the ones found in the sections
where the retirement age is allowed to vary.
The paper uses an overlapping generations growth model where individu-
als face two stages in their life.1 In the model it is assumed that individuals
have several ways in which they can prepare for retirement. They can
put money away for their later years through a deﬁned contribution plan,
they can participate in a private deﬁned beneﬁt plan, and they can continue
working beyond their normal retirement age. While social security is not
addressed in the paper, social security has many attributes that makes it
similar to the deﬁned beneﬁt plan modeled here. The deﬁned contribution
plans are assumed to invest their funds solely in private capital.
The uncertainty considered here arises from macroeconomic ﬂuctuations.
In that situation there is no type of riskless pension plan. In the case of
a deﬁned contribution plan the risk is borne by the retirees2. As for the
private deﬁned beneﬁt plan, even though the pensioners may view the plan as
riskless, ﬁrms, or as in our model where the burden is shifted to the employed,
1There are other papers that study endogenous retirement in an overlapping generations
model. However, those models do not view retirement as a hedge against uncertainty.
An example without social security is Matsuyama (2008) and two examples that study
social security in such a setting are Hu (1979) and Michel and Pestieau (2002-2003).
2"The pegging of beneﬁts in DB plans to ﬁnal average wage would appear to provide
employees with a type of income-maintenance insurance not available in DC plans. This
observation has been used to support the selection of these plans over DC plans. This
conclusion, however, is not robust. If wage paths are unpredictable at the start of a
career, then individuals may view it as very risky to have their retirement beneﬁts depend
so heavily on ﬁnal salary." ((Bodie, Marcus, and Merton (1988), page 147.)
3the young workders bear the burden of the risk3,4.
In this paper it is shown that allowing individuals to choose their age of
retirement gives them an important tool to overcome the uncertainty they
face during their golden years and raises their welfare since it gives them
the ﬂexibility to make their retirement decisions based on the circumstances
they will be facing. In fact, we ﬁnd that the labor market adjustments
that individuals undertake at retirement may be even more important than
changes in saving as individuals face increased uncertainty in the second
phase of their lives. When the age of retirement is independent of the state
of nature, we ﬁnd in general that when individuals face greater uncertainty in
the future, such as when the beneﬁt rate on deﬁned beneﬁt pension plans is
reduced or the diﬀerence in productivity across states increases they increase
the amount of time they spend working during the second period of their
lives. When we give individuals the additional tool to make their age of
retirement state dependent, we ﬁnd that the consumption gap across states
when individuals are retired is in general reduced as compared to when the
age of retirement is not allowed to vary across states. Thus not only is work
eﬀort in the second period an important stabilizer for individuals, allowing
individuals to adjust that eﬀort across states is an important additional tool
as well. In addition, these tools turn out to be an important substitute to
saving, particularly to deﬁned contribution pension saving. In comparing
labor adjustment in period 2 when that adjustment is state dependent versus
when it is not, we ﬁnd that saving through deﬁned contribution plans is lower
when the age of retirement is state dependent. Allowing individuals to make
their retirement decision state contingent means that they do not have to save
as much for the future and still have the wherewithal to consume an adequate
amount in the second period.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents
the basic theoretical model. Section 2.2 is devoted to discussing the im-
plications of changing some of the exogenous variables. Unfortunately, for
some of the outcomes and especially when two or more exogenous variables
are changed simultaneously, the results end up being ambiguous. There-
3In terms of funding there is a big diﬀerence between deﬁned contribution and deﬁned
beneﬁt plans. "In deﬁned contribution plans, by deﬁnition the value of the beneﬁts equal
that of the assets, so the plan is always exactly fully funded. But in deﬁned beneﬁt plans,
there is a continuum of possibilities. There may be no separate fund, in which case the
plan is said to be unfunded. When there is a separate fund with assets worth less than
the present value of the promised beneﬁts, the plan is underfunded. And if the plan’s
assets have a market value that exceeds the present value of the plan’s liabilities, it is
overfunded." (Bodie and Papke (1992), page 152.)
4Bodie, Marcus, and Merton (1988) discuss some of the trade-oﬀs when comparing
deﬁned beneﬁt and deﬁned contribution plans.
4fore section three presents a numerical simulation model and discusses the
lessons learned from it. The section with the numerical example is divided
into three parts. The ﬁrst subsection assumes that the decision about when
to retire is made independent of the state of nature. The second subsection
provides individuals with an extra degree of freedom by allowing them to
determine their retirement based on the state of nature they face. The third
part tries to come close to replicating the standard model by assuming that
there is a mandatory retirement age in eﬀect. This last subsection tries to
compare the results when variable retirement is allowed with the case when
the retirement decision is externally set. Finally, the last section presents
some conclusions.
2 The theoretical model.
2.1 Presentation
We use a standard overlapping generations model which has two states of the
world. The population is assumed to grow at the rate n and productivity
gets enhanced at the rate g. All individuals work in the ﬁrst period of
their lives and retire in the second. We distinguish two types of retirement.
Statutory retirement that occurs at the end of the ﬁrst period and after
which pension beneﬁts are awarded and eﬀective retirement that occurs in the
second period when the individual ceases to work. Individuals have access
to private pensions which consist of a combination of a deﬁned beneﬁt and a
deﬁned contribution plan. The following equations specify the optimization
problem and constraints faced by a typical person.
max.5[u(ct1) + u(ct2)] + δ[.5u(ct+1,1) + .5u(ct+1,2) + ηV (1 − zt+1)] (1)
subject to:
ctj + Kt+1 = wtjAtj(1 − ζj)Lt;j = 1,2 (2)
ct+1,j = (1 + r
K
t+1,j)Kt+1 + θ   wtLt + wt+1,jzt+1LtAt+1,j;j = 1,2 (3)
The lifetime utility of an individual depends upon his consumption in
each period and state and the amount of time spent working in the second
5period. In equation (1) u(.) and V(.) are strictly concave functions and
δ is a factor of time preference. Individuals maximize utility over the two
periods and in each period there are two possible states of the world that
can each occur with probability .5. Subscripts are used to denote ﬁrst
the period and second the state of nature. The argument of the utility
function is consumption, c, in each period and the amount of time spent
in retirement in the second period, 1 − zt+1. Each period having a unitary
length, 1+z can be considered as the eﬀective age of retirement. When z=0
eﬀective and statutory retirement coincide. The parameter η measures the
preference for leisure or retirement. In the simulations later in the paper
the utility function is assumed to take the constant relative risk aversion
functional form. Equation (2) denotes the budget constraint faced by the
typical person of generation t when he/she is young. Individuals decide how
much to consume when they are young, ctj,j = 1,2, and how much to save.
Private saving can be done either through the deﬁned beneﬁt plan, where
ζj represents the fraction of the average salary withheld from the employee
and used to contribute to his deﬁned beneﬁt plan,5 or through the purchase
of private capital, Kt+1, that becomes part of his deﬁned contribution plan.
We assume that the value of Kt+1 is determined by the individual. While
in some deﬁned contribution plans the employer may be a contributor, in
almost all cases the worker can supplement the ﬁrm’s contribution and thus
the value of Kt+1 at the margin is determined by the individual. To keep
the model relatively simple we do not include bonds as one of the options
for individuals in their deﬁned contribution plan. By excluding bonds we
do not have to include public goods or an income tax. In our model the
deﬁned beneﬁt pension plan picks up some of the attributes of risk-free bonds.
Moreover, for other types of bonds, capital can act as a partial proxy.
The net income of a typical individual whenyoung consists of wage income
from labor after deﬁned beneﬁt contributions, wtj(1−ζj)AtjLt. The amount
set aside by workers for the deﬁned beneﬁt plan is assumed to be ζjwtjAtjLt.
Not only is the amount contributed state dependent but the percentage of the
wage paid out by the young, ζj, is state dependent. Even though the deﬁned
beneﬁt plan is provided by the employer, we assume that the incidence is
such that the burden of the pension plan falls on the worker. The labor
5In this paper we are not attempting to do a general equilibrium analysis of deﬁned
beneﬁt plans. Ebrahim (2006) argues that if one wanted to do a general equilibrium
analysis one would need to deﬁne them in terms of "not only the income but also expected
portfolio payoﬀs. This is radically diﬀerent from that observed in the ’real world’, where it
is deﬁned strictly in terms of pensionable salary, which is derived only using the average of
that in pre-retirement years (after incorporating the number of years of service)." (Ebrahim
(2006), page 15.)
6supply, Lt, can be viewed as eﬃciency labor. Uncertainty is introduced in
this model through diﬀerences in productivity in the two states, Atj,j = 1,2.
The variation in productivity in turn means that the wage rate, wtj, is also
state dependent. When individuals are old they face budget constraints (3).
Their income consists of the payout from capital in the deﬁned contribution
plan, where the return on capital in period t+1 is rK
t+1,j,j = 1,2, the payout
from the deﬁned beneﬁt plan, where θ is the payout rate from the deﬁned
beneﬁt plan, and the amount received from wage income generated during
the fraction of the time in period two that they spend working, zt+1. It is
assumed that the fraction θ is a parameter and thus its value is outside the
control of the individual. The payout from the deﬁned beneﬁt plan is θ
times the average wage income earned in period t. We deﬁne the average
wage as:
  wt = (wt1At1 + wt2At2)/2. (4)
Deﬁned beneﬁt plans can be funded from a pool of safe assets purchased
to sustain the plans. However, when there are macro shocks, at the margin,
corporations need to cover the diﬀerence between the amount paid out by
the plan and the amount one can get by selling the safe assets. Thus, with
uncertainty, the amount corporations need to set aside to insure that the
deﬁned beneﬁt plans can be funded will vary. However, to the extent that
the incidence of the burden of the deﬁned beneﬁt pension falls on workers, the
amount that workers need to contribute will ﬂuctuate with the uncertainty.
In our simpliﬁed model we try to address these issues by arguing that the
amount workers pay in when young equals the amount paid out by the deﬁned
beneﬁt plans to the retirees, i.e.,
ζjwt+1,jAt+1,jLt+1 = θ   wtLt;j = 1,2. (5)
In the steady state both the labor force and productivity grow at a constant
rate and therefore the above equation can be rewritten as:
ζjwt,jAtjLt(1 + n)(1 + g) = θ   wtLt;j = 1,2. (6)
Since the payout from the deﬁned beneﬁt plan is state independent, we also
need the relationship,
ζ1wt+1,1At+1,1 = ζ2wt+1,2At+1,2 (7)
It is quite clear that deﬁned beneﬁt pensions imply a harsh burden on
workers in case of an adverse state of nature. This explains why ﬂexible
retirement will appear as a welcome substitute for such a burden.
7Saving by the workers through their deﬁned contribution plans can be
found by substituting the budget constraints (2) and (3), into equation (1).









t+1,2)] = 0 (8)
To determine the amount of labor supplied by individuals in the second





′(1 − zt+1)] = 0
(9)
For the production side we assume a standard constant returns to scale
Cobb-Douglas production function that takes the form:
Ytj = K
α
t (AtjLt(1 + zt+1/(1 + n)))
1−α;j = 1,2 (10)
where Ytj represents output in period t and state j. The rates of return on
the factors of production can be written as:
∂Ytj/∂Kt = αK
α−1
t (AtjLt(1 + zt+1/(1 + n)))
1−α = r
K
tj;j = 1,2 (11)
and
∂Ytj/∂(AtjLt) = (1 − α)K
α
t (AtjLt(1 + zt+1/(1 + n)))
−α = wtj;j = 1,2 (12)
The variable wtj represents the wage per unit of eﬀective labor at time t in
state j and the wage per unit of Lt would be wtjAtj. It should be noted
that since the growth rates are constant, we also know that wtj = wt+1,j and
rK
tj = rK
t+1,j for j = 1,2.
To summarize, the model described in this section consists of the equa-
tions (2)-(4) and (6)-(12) in the unknowns, ctj,ct+1,j,   wt,Ytj,Kt,wtj,
rK
tj,ζ1,ζ2,and zt+1.
82.2 Implications of the Theoretical Model
In this subsection we use the theoretical model speciﬁed in the previous sub-
section to analyze the impact of a reduction in the payout from the deﬁned
beneﬁt plans, a change in preference for leisure, and a change in the value
of the discount factor. Unfortunately, the theory provides very few unam-
biguous results and thus we add examples that use speciﬁc functional forms
to ﬂush out more deﬁnitive results. Moreover, in the simulations section, in
addition to replicating the impact of a reduction in the payout from the de-
ﬁned beneﬁt plans, we look at other changes, such as changes in the amount
of uncertainty, that are hard to analyze analytically.
Deﬁned beneﬁt pension plans place most of the risk on the workers
whereas deﬁned contribution pension plans place most of the risk associ-
ated with the plan on the retirees. Thus, a shift away from the reliance on
private deﬁned beneﬁt plans places more risk on the retirees. When such
a change occurs one ﬁnds that the contributions to the deﬁned contribution
plan rise but also the age of retirement rises as well. As the amount of
uncertainty faced by the retirees rises they hedge their bets by postponing
retirement. The increase in saving through the purchase of additional capital
also means that the rate of return on capital falls and the wage rate rises.
When there is an increase in the discount factor so that individuals care
more about the future, they increase the amount of capital that they purchase
and are likely to reduce their retirement age. By placing greater weight on
the second period, individuals would both like to consume more in the second
period and also have longer retirement. However, the impact on zt+1can go
in the other direction since the result also depends on how much the increase
in the capital stock lowers the rate of return on capital and raises the wage
rate.
Finally, when there is an increase in preference for leisure there is a de-
crease in the age of retirement. The natural expectation when η increases is
that there should be an increase in the capital stock and in turn a decrease
in the rate of return on capital and an increase in the wage rate. However,
an increase in capital means that there will be a reduction in consumption in
period one. Thus, depending on the shape of the utility function, one could
actually ﬁnd cases where the capital stock actually declines in this situation.
Even though this model abstracts from many aspects of reality, as noted
above, it is not possible to theoretically sign even relatively simple changes in
the parameters of the model presented earlier.6 To get some further insights
6An analysis of the model requires that it be diﬀerentiated and placed in matrix form.
Since the results from the theoretical model tend to be ambiguous and the solution of the
model is largely technical in nature we have omitted the solution from the paper. For
9into the issues that are the focus of this paper, the next section presents
some computer simulations on the version presented in the model section,
one where the values of zt+1 are state dependent, as well as one where a
mandatory retirement age is in eﬀect.
3 Results from the Numerical Example
This section is intended to provide further insights into some of the issues
discussed in the previous part of the paper as well as to explore some related
topics. In the numerical example we use a utility function that is assumed
to be isoelastic. It takes the form:
U(.) = .5[(ct1)(1−γ) + (ct2)(1−γ)]/(1 − γ)]+
δ{.5[(ct+1,1)(1−γ) + (ct+1,2)(1−γ)]/(1 − γ) + η(1 − zt+1)1−β/(1 − β)}
(13)
where γ is the Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion and β is the
exponent on the leisure term.
In addition, for the simulations we use the somewhat more general CES
production function that takes the form,
Ytj = [(aKKt)
ρ + (aLAtjLt(1 + zt+1/(1 + n)))
ρ]
1/ρ;j = 1,2 (14)
where aK is the coeﬃcient on capital in the CES production function, aL is
the coeﬃcient on labor, and ρ takes on values from 1 to -∞.
The simulation model in this section does not use parameter values that
pretend to mimic the American or any other existing economy. Rather, the
policy changes introduced here are intended to indicate the types of eﬀects
that would be expected to occur in an economy from the policy alterations
that are analyzed in the example. Moreover, the policy changes introduced
are relatively large so that one can easily see the various impacts. One should
also note that we have collapsed the many years in the lives of workers and
retirees into two periods. This section is divided into three subsections. The
ﬁrst analyzes policy changes when the age of retirement is independent of the
state, the second subsection looks at the case where the age of retirement can
vary with the state of nature, and the third assumes a mandatory retirement
age.
3.1 Retirement is independent of the state
The simulations described in this section are summarized in Table 1. The
ﬁrst column of the table describes the base model. In the base model the
those interested, the solution can be obtained from the authors.
10exponent of the utility of consumption is 3.5 and the exponent on the leisure
term is 4. We assume that the rate of labor force growth, n, and the rate
of technological change, g, are each 50%. The labor supply of individuals,
Lt, takes a value of 10 and the discount factor, δ, takes on a value of .9.
The level of productivity in state 1, At1, is 3 and in state 2, At2, is 1. In
the CES production function the coeﬃcient on capital takes on a value of .3,
that of labor is set at .7, and ρ has a value of .65. Also the preference for
leisure, η, takes on a value of 8. Finally, the beneﬁt rate on private deﬁned
beneﬁt pensions, θ, is .2. We did try other parameter values for the base
model and found that the results below were robust to changes in the initial
parameter values.
In Table 1 we summarize the values of the most important variables.
The ones that are left out either do not add much to the explanation, or,
as in the case of the utility of the participants, the direction of change can
actually be inferred by seeing how individual consumptions move. Moreover,
in those cases where ﬁrst period and second period consumption move in
opposite directions, what happens to the value of utility is very dependent
on the magnitude of the exponent of consumption in the utility function, a
parameter for which it is diﬃcult to come up with a "true value".
The ﬁrst policy change in Table 1 replicates the exercise of the theoretical
section by lowering the beneﬁt rate on deﬁned beneﬁt pensons from .2 to
.1. As before, this change results in an increase in saving through deﬁned
contribution pensions and hence an increase in the capital stock and the
average wage. In addition, the increase in the uncertainty faced by the older
workers means that thay will increase the age of retirement from .120 to
.126. The reduction in θ also means that consumption of the young rises
but the increased uncertainty faced by the elderly means that the spread in
consumption of the elderly between the good and bad states rises as well.
For example, the consumption of the elderly in the good state rises from 9.67
to 9.87 but in the bad state it falls from 6.55 to 6.40.
The second exercise is to increase the discount factor from .9 to .95. By
placing greater weight on the second period, saving is increased from 1.050
to 1.094 (as is the average wage) and the amount of time spent working in
the second period is reduced from .120 to .117. This policy also reduces
consumption in period one and tends to increase consumption in period two.
The results for this example are consistent with wideheld concerns that stem
from the view that people do not place suﬃciently high weight on the future.
For example, this exercise shows that if individuals tend to ignore the future
they will consume too much in period one, not save enough for the future.
and will be forced to postpone retirement beyond the statutory age.
The next exercise is to increase the preference for retirement from 8. to 9.
11That change results in an increase in savings and hence the size of the capital
stock from 1.050 to 1.104 and reduces the amount of time spent working in
the second period from .120 to .107. The extra emphasis on retirement also
means that consumption in both period one and period two is reduced. The
extra saving in period one reduces consumption in period one and the lower
age of retirement is the main factor in reducing consumption in period two.
The fourth change is to increase the gap in productivities between states
one and two. Now productivity becomes 3.25 in state one and .75 in state
two. The increase in spread in productivities also means that there will
be a wider spread in consumption between the good and bad states in both
consumption when young and consumption when retired. This change also
results in a reduction in the amount saved through the deﬁned contribution
plans. The way individuals prepare for the future is by spending more time
working in the second period. For example, the amount of time spent work-
ing rises from .120 to .185. Of course, if working during the second period
were not possible, such a large downward adjustment in saving through the
deﬁned contribution plans would not be possible. Earlier it was noted that
all pension funds in a world of macroeconomic uncertainty result in risk be-
ing placed on the shoulders of all the participants. Deﬁned contribution
plans place the uncertainty on individuals in the second period and deﬁned
beneﬁt plans place it on them in period one. When uncertainty increases,
a relatively large burden is borne by the workers in the state with the low
productivity in order to pay for the deﬁned beneﬁt plans. The rate at which
individuals need to contribute to fund the deﬁned beneﬁt plan in state 2
rises from .175 in the base case to .235 when the gap in productivities is
increased. Thus, a large reduction in consumption in period 1 state 2 is the
result. In order to mitigate that decrease to some extent, workers reduce
their contributions to their deﬁned contribution plans. In the second period
individuals hope to be able to maintain a reasonable level of consumption by
using the option to retire later.
As a point of comparison, the next change increases the gap in productiv-
ities between states one and two as well as decreases the beneﬁt rate on the
deﬁned beneﬁt pension plans. This policy change results, not surprisingly, in
a combined eﬀect of the two policies separately. The gap in consumption in
periods one and two between states one and two is larger than for the policy
that increases the gap in productivities alone. For example, for the combined
policy in period 2 consumption in state one is 10.83 whereas it is 4.97 in state
two. When only the productivity gap increases, the consumptions are 10.32
and 5.12 respectively. Also, for the combined policy saving is higher at .860
than for just the increase in the productivity gap where it is .288. The main
adjustment for the increased uncertainty coming from the combined plan is
12through the age of retirement. For the combined policy zt+1 is .196, whereas
it is .186 for just the increase in the gap and it is only .126 when the only
change is the decrease in the beneﬁt rate to .1. The reduction in the beneﬁt
rate on the deﬁned beneﬁt plans also means that the contribution rate by
the young towards the deﬁned beneﬁt plan in state two will be reduced from
.235 to .116. This large decrease means that consumption in period 1 state 2
can be higher even with an increase in saving. Of course the smaller deﬁned
beneﬁt plan means more uncertainty for individuals in period 2 and hence
the decision to retire later.
The next change explored is an increase in both the growth rate of the
population and of productivity from .5 to .6. The increase in the growth
rates means that the dependency ratio is reduced, i.e., the amount of eﬀective
labor available in period one is increased relative to the the number of re-
tired individuals in period two. Note, our model collapses the many periods
in an individual’s life into two and thus the relatively large number for the
growth rate. The higher growth rate means that there is more money avail-
able for each retiree through the deﬁned beneﬁt plans at the same deﬁned
contribution rate for these plans. Thus, the increase in growth rates mean
that consumption in both periods one and two rise as does the capital stock.
Since the contribution rate to the deﬁned beneﬁt plans falls, individuals are
able to save more through their deﬁned contribution plans. Finally, the
amount of time spent working in the second period is reduced. The higher
utility of the individual when the growth rate is increased comes not only
from the higher levels of consumption but also the ability of individuals to
increase their leisure time in the second period.
Table 1
Numerical example where work during retirement is independent of state
Policy θ = .1 δ = .95 η = 9. At1 = 3.25 At1 = 3.25 n = .6
∆ At2 = .75 At2,θ = .75,.1 g = .6
ct1 19.09 19.20 19.05 19.05 21.38 21.62 19.18
ct2 4.95 5.02 4.92 4.91 3.81 3.97 5.05
ct+1,1 9.67 9.87 9.67 9.37 10.32 10.83 9.92
ct+1,2 6.55 6.40 6.60 6.51 5.12 4.97 6.70
Kt+1 1.050 1.719 1.094 1.104 .288 .860 1.093
ζ1 .060 .030 .060 .060 .055 .028 .052
ζ2 .175 .087 .175 .175 .235 .116 .154
  wt 1.43 1.45 1.44 1.44 1.42 1.43 1.43
zt+1 .120 .126 .117 .107 .185 .196 .115
133.2 Retirement is State Dependent
In this section of the paper we give individuals an extra degree of freedom
and allow them to make the age of retirement state dependent. In comparing
the examples in this section with those in the last one, individuals will have
higher utility here for comparable cases than when work eﬀort is independent
of state. The parameter values are the same for both Tables 1 and 2. In
comparing the ﬁrst column of both tables one will notice that the gap in
consumption for individuals in period 2 is smaller in Table 2 than in Table
1. For example, in Table 1 the diﬀerence is 9.67-6.55=3.12 whereas in
Table 2 the diﬀerence is 9.35-6.67=2.68. The reason for the smaller gap in
Table 2 is that individuals are able to partially adjust for the diﬀerence in
productivity across states by adjusting their work eﬀort in period 2 across
states. Individuals spend a fraction .1115 working in state 1 and .1343 in
state 2 whereas, when they cannot adjust their work eﬀort across states they
work .1196. When the time worked in period two is not state dependent,
the work eﬀort takes on a value that is between the time worked in the two
states when the work eﬀort can be adjusted. Also, when work eﬀort is state
dependent the amount that needs to be saved through deﬁned contribution
plans is a little lower, the capital stock rising by 1.028 as compared to 1.050
when work eﬀort is not state dependent. Thus, the work eﬀort adjustment
can oﬀset required saving to some extent.
In the ﬁrst example we look at the impact of a reduction in θ from .2 to .1.
This policy shifts more of the uncertainty to the retirees. The consumption
gap for the retirees when the age of retirement is state dependent rises to
9.36-6.58=2.78. However, this increase in the gap is smaller than in the case
where work eﬀort in period 2 is not state dependent, i.e., 9.87-6.40=3.47.
Thus, part of the increased uncertainty is oﬀset through changes in the age of
retirement across states when that is possible. In state 2 time spent working
in period 2 rises from .134 to .147 as can be seen in Table 2. In both
cases individuals increase saving through their deﬁned contribution plans.
However, the increase is smaller when work eﬀort is state dependent, 1.678-
1.028=.650 than when it is not, 1.719-1.050=.669
The second case analyzed is an increase in the discount factor from .9
to .95. The higher discount factor means that individuals care more about
the future. As in the previous example one notices that the consumption gap
in period 2 is smaller, 9.38-6.71=2.67 when work eﬀort in period 2 is state
dependent than when it is not, 9.67-6.60=3.07. Similarly, the increase in
capital is smaller at 1.073 when there is state dependency as compared to
the 1.094 when work eﬀort in period 2 is independent of state. While the
higher discount factor tends to reduce work eﬀort, the variation in work eﬀort
14across states, .109 in state 1 and .130 in state 2, allows individuals to hedge
the future through an adjustment in labor supply in period two.
The third change is to increase the preference for leisure during period two
from .8 to .9. By placing greater weight on leisure, consumption is reduced
in both periods one and two. However, even in this situation individuals
use work eﬀort in period 2 for smoothing purposes. For example the gap
in consumption in period 2 is 9.37-6.51=2.86 when work eﬀort in period 2
is independent of state but 9.16-6.60=2.50 when it is state dependent. The
increased emphasis on leisure in period 2 also means that saving will be
increased from the base case. However, saving is still smaller when the age
of retirement is state dependent in period 2 as compared to when it is not.
While individuals use the age of retirement to try to smooth consumption in
period 2, the gap in work eﬀort is smaller at η =.9 than for the base case.
The gap is .117-.101=.016 at η=.9 and .134-.112=.022 for the base case.
The next example studies the impact of an increase in the gap in produc-
tivities between states one and two. When productivities are 3.25 in state
one and .75 in state two, the increase in uncertainty means that the consump-
tion gap across states increases. The increase in uncertainty also means that
the gap in work eﬀort in period 2 is now larger than for the base case, rising
from .134-.112=.022 to .228-.152=.076 for the larger productivity gap. The
increase in the productivity gap means that individuals try to use retirement
to help reduce the second period consumption gap. In comparing the con-
sumption gap in period 2 when the age of retirement is not state dependent,
10.32-5.12=5.20, with the gap when it is, 9.04-5.36=3.68, one notices quite
a large reduction in the gap. In the good state individuals cut their age of
retirement quite a bit if they can do so and they likewise increase it in the
bad state to help increase consumption in state 2 period 2 as compared to the
case where the retirement decision is not state dependent. Finally, saving
when the age of retirement is state dependent is slightly lower than when it
is not. Less saving is required since labor in period 2 is doing some of the
smoothing. Also for this reason consumption in period 1 is slightly higher
when one has state dependency in period 2 than when state dependency is
not allowed.
To provide further insight into the impact of increased uncertainty the
next case studied is one where the gap in productivities across states one
and two is increased and at the same time there is a decrease in the beneﬁt
rate on the deﬁned beneﬁt pension plans. The results tend to reﬂect the
combined eﬀect of the two policies separately. When the age of retirement
is state dependent, since labor supply in period two can oﬀset some of the
uncertainty faced by individuals, saving is reduced to .772 from .860. This
reduction in saving means that consumption in period 1 is higher when labor
15is state dependent in period 2. Also, the large diﬀerence in the age of
retirement between state 1 and state 2, .152 and .248 respectively, means
that the consumption gap in period 2 is reduced quite a bit as well, falling
from 10.83-4.97=5.86 to 9.06-5.23=3.83. Finally, consumption in period
one state 2 will be higher in this case than both the case where the age
of retirement is not state dependent and when there is no reduction in the
deﬁned beneﬁt pension. The lower contribution rate to the deﬁned beneﬁt
plan when that plan is reduced as well as the lower saving required when
the retirement decision is state dependent both contribute to the higher level
of consumption in period 1 state 2. Finally, consumption in period 2 state
2 will be higher. To see the important impact of allowing the retirement
decision to be made state dependent, one can notice that consumption in
period 2 state 2 is higher with state dependency than in the case where
the deﬁned beneﬁt plan is kept unchanged and the retirement decision is
not state dependent, i.e., 5.23 as compared to 5.12. On the other hand, if
one wants to isolate on the eﬀect of making the retirement state dependent,
one sees an increase in consumption in period 2 state 2 from 4.97 when the
retirement decision is independent of the state to 5.23 when the decision is
state dependent.
The last experiment is to lower the dependency rate by increasing the
growth rate of both the population and productivity from .5 to .6. As
indicated in the section where the age of retirement is state independent, in-
dividuals are better oﬀ when the growth rate of population and productivity
rise. However, when the age of retirement is state dependent we notice that
in state 1 individuals lower labor supply and in state 2 they increase it as
compared to when the retirement decision is independent of the state. This
change means that the consumption gap in period two is lower when there is
state dependency, 9.58-6.83=2.75 versus 9.92-6.70=3.22 when labor supply
is not state dependent. In fact, consumption in period 2 state 1 is actually
lower when labor is state dependent. This reduction in consumption occurs
both because the age of retirement in state 1 is lower and because individuals
lower the amount they feel they need to save through deﬁned contribution
plans when they can make period 2 state dependent labor adjustments. In
state of 1 period 2 individuals are well enough oﬀ that they feel that they can
aﬀord to spend more time in retirement. The lower saving also means that
consumption in period 1 is higher when the age of retirement is state depen-
dent. Finally, with retirement being state dependent, consumption in period
2 state 2 will be higher than when the retirement decision is independent of
the state even though the amount saved through the deﬁned contribution
plan is lower. This result again shows the importance of allowing state
dependent retirement decisions.
16In most standard models most of the adjustment across periods is done
through saving behavior. In this paper, the last two sections have shown
that when individuals are able to supply some labor in period 2, most of
the adjustment is done through changes in labor supply during the second
period. Moreover, when labor supply in period 2 is made state dependent,
that dependency adds a very important factor in allowing individuals to
smooth consumption across periods.
Table 2
Numerical example where Work During Retirement is State Dependent
Policy θ = .1 δ = .95 η = 9. At1 = 3.25 At1 = 3.25 n = .6
∆ At2 = .75 At2,θ = .75,.1 g = .6
ct1 19.10 19.24 19.07 19.06 21.41 21.69 19.20
ct2 4.97 5.05 4.93 4.92 3.84 4.04 5.07
ct+1,1 9.35 9.36 9.38 9.16 9.04 9.06 9.58
ct+1,2 6.67 6.58 6.71 6.60 5.36 5.23 6.83
Kt+1 1.028 1.678 1.073 1.088 .243 .772 1.069
ζ1 .060 .030 .060 .060 .055 .028 .052
ζ2 .175 .087 .175 .175 .235 .117 .154
  wt .143 1.45 1.43 1.44 1.41 1.43 1.43
zt+1,1 .112 .113 .109 .101 .152 .152 .107
zt+1,2 .134 .147 .130 .117 .288 .248 .129
3.3 Mandatory Retirement Age
To put our results into perspective, in this subsection we brieﬂy discuss the
case where individuals do not work in the second period. One can view this
situation as one where a mandatory retirement age is in eﬀect. Moreover,
this situation comes closest to describing the results for the standard model
and thus we will get a better understanding of how our results deviate from
what is normally obtained. In Table 3 we use the same parameter values
as those found in Tables 1 and 2. The big diﬀerence is that in period 2
individuals here spend all of their time in leisure activities.
There are several diﬀerences between the results of the previous two sub-
sections and this one. First, utility is lower when individuals are constrained
not to work. While leisure is larger when there is a mandatory retirement
17age, consumption in all states and in both periods is lower. Second, sav-
ing through the deﬁned contribution pension plan is higher when individuals
cannot oﬀset future uncertainty by deferring their retirement. Moreover,
saving is lower still when labor supply in period 2 is made state dependent.
Third, while allowing individuals to retire at a later age provides another
mechanism to increase consumption in period 2, to the extent that produc-
tivities vary across states, the gap in consumption in period 2 between states
1 and 2 is larger when labor in period 2 is permitted. This result holds even
when second period labor supply is state dependent. Even though individu-
als work longer in the state with the lower productivity, that factor does not
completely oﬀset the diﬀerence in productivities between the good and bad
states.
Looking more speciﬁcally at the changes in the policy parameters, we ﬁnd
that when the deﬁned beneﬁt rate is reduced from .2 to .1, in all three tables
consumption in period 1 rises and saving through the deﬁned contribution
plans is increased. In period 2, the gap in consumption between states 1 and
2 increases the most when labor in period 2 is independent of state and rises
the least when labor in period 2 can be adjusted across states. Thus, while
in all three tables the gap in consumption in period 2 rises as one reduces
the dependency on the deﬁned beneﬁt plans, making labor in period 2 state
dependent is more eﬀective in keeping the increase in the gap of consumption
in period 2 from rising too much than relying solely on the increase in saving
through the deﬁned contribution plan.
When the discount is raised to .95, consumption in period 1 is reduced
and saving is increased in all three situations. In period 2 consumption tends
to rise in all three situations. However, one should note that when labor in
period 2 can vary, leisure time is increased when the discount rate is raised
and thus the increase in consumption in period 2 will be larger when there
exists a mandatory retirement age.
An increase in the diﬀerence in productivities raises the gap in consump-
tion between states 1 and 2 in both periods one and two when workers can
adjust their retirement age, although the increase in the gap in period 2 con-
sumption will be smaller when labor in period 2 is state dependent. However,
when there is a mandatory retirement age and the diﬀerence in productivity
across states increases, the gap in consumption in period 2 between the good
and bad state actually falls. This fall in the gap is due to the reduction in
saving through the deﬁned contribution plan in this situation and the fact
that individuals do not work in the second period. Relatively more saving
is done through the deﬁned beneﬁt plan in this case and hence the reduction
in the gap. One should note that consumption in state 2 period 1 is smaller
when there is a mandatory retirement age in eﬀect than in the cases where
18the retirement decision is ﬂexible. Individuals reduce the amount they put
into their deﬁned contribution plan to try to keep consumption in state 1
period 1 from falling too far. At the same time, since individuals cannot
supplement their second period income by working in the second period in
the case discussed here, they cannot reduce savings too much if they wish
to have the wherewithal to provide for adequate consumption in period two.
Even so, consumption in period 2 when there is mandatory retirement is
lower than in the other cases.
The next case increases the diﬀerence in productivities but at the same
time lowers the beneﬁts from the deﬁned beneﬁt pension program. In com-
paring the base case with the situation where the gap in productivity rises
and there is a lower beneﬁt rate on the deﬁned beneﬁt plan, one notices that
the gap in consumption in period 2 across the two states increases by far the
least when one has a mandatory retirement age in eﬀect. When labor can
vary in period 2, at the larger diﬀerence in productivity across the two states
and the lower beneﬁt rate, there is quite a large increase in work eﬀort in
period 2 and it is this increase in work eﬀort in the two states that results
in the larger consumption gap. In the case with mandatory retirement and
the larger productivity gap, the increase in the gap in consumption in period
2 is a result of the switch from deﬁned beneﬁt to deﬁned contribution plans.
When the beneﬁts from the deﬁned beneﬁt plan are reduced, individuals
increase their saving through the deﬁned contribution plan. This switch
increases the gap in period 2 consumption but also results in a reduction in
the average second period consumption. Also, the reduction in consumption
in perod 2 state 2 is larger for the case with mandatory retirement than in
the other cases. Indviduals are not able to oﬀset the lower consumption by
increasing work eﬀort.
A reduction in the dependency ratio by raising both the rate of growth
of productivity and labor to .6, raises consumption in all states and both
periods as well as saving in all three tables. The only diﬀerence is that when
labor in period two can vary, there is an increase in leisure time when the
dependency ratio falls. It is, however, interesting that even with the increase
in leisure in the cases where retirement can vary, consumption in period 2
rises more in those cases than in the case where there exists a mandatory
retirement age.
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Numerical example where there is a Mandatory Retirement Age
Policy θ = .1 δ = .95 At1 = 3.25 At1 = 3.25 n = .6
∆ At2 = .75 At2,θ = .75,.1 g = .6
ct1 18.642 18.698 18.618 20.986 21.100 18.718
ct2 4.45 4.46 4.43 3.32 3.36 4.54
ct+1,1 7.05 7.05 7.11 5.46 5.54 7.25
ct+1,2 6.30 6.10 6.35 4.81 4.59 6.44
Kt+1 1.648 2.384 1.678 .890 1.587 1.693
ζ1 .060 .030 .060 .055 .028 .052
ζ2 .174 .087 .174 .232 .115 .153
  wt 1.45 1.46 1.45 1.43 1.45 1.45
4 Conclusion
One of the concerns raised over the last few years is that individuals are not
saving suﬃcient amounts for their retirement. This concern is becoming even
more important as life expectancy increases and individual health improves.
While we do not argue in this paper that saving is not important, especially
if unexpected events such as bad health occur that are hard to hedge against,
we ﬁnd that using a ﬂexible retirement age as a means of hedging against the
future may be a very important substitute to large amounts of saving. In fact
we ﬁnd that ﬂexibility in the retirement age can be a very good supplement
to saving in preparing for the future. As the amount of ﬂexibility is increased
the optimal amount of saving required is reduced. For example, when the
ﬂexible retirement age is independent of the state of nature the optimal
amount of saving is lower than when a mandatory retirement age is in eﬀect.
However, when the retirement age is made state dependent, the optimal
amount of saving is lower yet. Of course, if individuals, perhaps because
they feel healthier, increase their preference for leisure one gets the expected
result that individuals would increase their saving so that they can end up
retiring at a younger age. But even in this case saving is lower when the
retirement age is ﬂexible, and when the retirement age is state dependent
individuals end up retiring later in the low productivity state than in the
higher productivity state.
Deﬁned beneﬁts and ﬂexible retirement have in common the attribute
that they both protect the retirees against adverse states of nature in the
20second period of their life. This appears clearly in Table 4 which presents
the expected utility levels for 5 values of the parameter that provides the
amount of deﬁned beneﬁts over the three retirement regimes. One ﬁrst sees
that the individual expected utility increases as we move from mandatory
to ﬂexible retirement. We also observe that for each retirement regime the
deﬁned beneﬁt parameter bringing the highest utility varies. It decreases as
we go from mandatory retirement (.25) to state independent retirement (.20)
and then to state dependent retirement (.10). This table shows quite clearly
that ﬂexible retirement is a substitute for deﬁned beneﬁt plans.
Table 4
Utilty level for diﬀerent retirement regimes and shares of deﬁned beneﬁt
saving.
Policy State Dependent State Independent Mandatory
θ = .3 .902804 .902797 .894792
θ = .25 .903876 .903837 .895219*
θ = .2 .904408 .904319* .895137
θ = .1 .904413* .904183 .893810
θ = .05 .904040 .903717 .892662
where * indicates the highest level of expected utility for each of the three
retirement scenarios.
Another issue that has been explored widely in the literature is the shift
that has been occurring from deﬁned beneﬁt retirement plans to deﬁned
contribution ones. The paper ﬁnds that with that type of a shift one should
expect to see an increase in saving and in turn an increase in the capital
stock as well as an increase in the retirement age of individuals as more of
the uncertainty is shifted to the retirees. In addition, when the retirement
decision is state dependent, the gap between the retirement age in the good
and bad states is increased.
The paper also looks at the impact of changing one’s views of the fu-
ture. For example, if individuals live more for today and put less weight
on the future one ﬁnds that saving will be reduced and retirement will end
up being postponed. This also means that consumption in period 2 will
be higher when the retirement age is ﬂexible than when a mandatory re-
tirement age is in eﬀect. The other important issue explored is the impact
of an increase in uncertainty. When uncertainty increases individuals re-
duce the amount they save through their deﬁned contribution plan so that
they can keep consumption in the low productivity state of period 1 from
falling too much. To oﬀset the lower saving individuals are forced to re-
tire later. Moreover, when the retirement decision is state dependent, the
21reduction in saving is even larger and hence the amount of consumption
in period 1 state 2 will be higher than when the retirement is independent
of the state. Individuals feel that they can reduce saving so much when
the retirement decision is state dependent since they can adjust their retire-
ment decision in period 2 based on the amount of uncertainty they will be
facing. Thus, there will be a relatively large increase in the gap in the retire-
ment age between the good and bad states when the degree of uncertainty
increases.
This paper suggests that studying the retirement decision in a world of
uncertainty is likely to provide insights that the literature on retirement that
assumes all life-cycle decisions are made in a world of certainty are missing.
Not only do macroeconomic shocks aﬀect individual retirement decisions but
also individual surprises such as changes in health are important factors
that need to be considered. In this paper we have deliberately focused on
a simple setting: a representative agent, no social security and two forms
of pensions (deﬁned beneﬁts and deﬁned contributions). In a forthcoming
paper (Pestieau and Possen, 2009) introduce individual heterogeneity along
with a social security system to tackle similar issues to those found in this
paper, and in particular the eﬀect that shifting from deﬁned beneﬁt to deﬁned
contribution pensions has on the age of retirement.
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